Blown Slick Series #13 Part 23 (1 of 2)
In 1945 U.S. fast carriers supported the final amphibious operations of the war—the invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa—drawing the noose tight around Tokyo’s neck. Aircraft from Third and Fifth fleet carriers also pounded the Home Islands, disproving the airpower theory that naval aviation could not match land-based air. In July three days of strikes against the major naval base at Kure finished off the floating remnants of the Imperial Japanese Navy.7
For all the American satisfaction of an overwhelming victory for U.S. naval aviation in 1945, the essence of the tailhookers’ war actually had occurred three years earlier. The most decisive victories for carrier airpower had been achieved during six months of 1942, when the United States and Japan fought four of the Pacific war’s five carrier battles. First defensively at Coral Sea and Midway, and then supporting the Guadalcanal offensive at the Eastern Solomons and the Santa Cruz Islands, U.S. carriers pointed the way to the Marianas—and to Japan itself. The Carrier Comes of Age by Barrett Tillman
This series was never intended to be a complete summary of the war in the Pacific in 1942 or of any of the particular battles. Its focus has been on the evolution of aircraft carrier operations in 1942. But the reality is, it’s near impossible to isolate the war itself from “the how of ops.” So, four posts will be used for concluding the series. Beginning here in the first of a two part Reflections the focus is on the nature of the Pacific war as 1942 closes, then followed by a second part addressing selected pieces of how carrier operations were conducted and evolved.
The final two posts will be Part 24 – Afterword by Barrett Tillman, addressing the state of carrier warfare as the Battle of the Philippine Sea in 1944 begins and #25 – Implications for Current Ops.
This offering contains the following two discussion areas:
- The Endgame for Guadalcanal (and 1942 carrier operations)
- Noted historian/author summaries of Guadalcanal and the state of the war in the Pacific at the end of 1942
1] Endgame for Guadalcanal
Summaries of World War II in the Pacific in general, and even narrower focus on the Guadalcanal Campaign itself tend to cover the period after the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal till the final abandonment in Feb 1943 with short summaries letting that mid-November battle stand as the final serious confrontation.
This allows a possible misrepresentation of the serious Japanese effort to retake the island in that the Japanese continued on into December to attempt supplying their troops ashore with multiple means. Indeed the naval Battle of Tassafaronga on the night of 30 November–1 December 1942, was one of the worst defeats suffered by the US Navy in World War II, third only to the Attack on Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Savo Island. Yet, despite their continued efforts and U.S. losses, the Japanese were still thwarted in their attempts at re-supply. Guadalcanal remained Starvation Island for Japanese troops.
Even with the substantial (longed for decisive battle) victory in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands which left the US Navy with no operational carriers in the Solomons, the Japanese were unable to close out the overall attempt to retake the island. Aviation leadership had been decimated, and troops on the island were starving and resupply simply wasn’t possible.
Finally, on December 12, the Navy proposed that Guadalcanal be abandoned. This was opposed by Japanese Army leaders, who still hoped that Guadalcanal could eventually be retaken from the Allies, but on December 31, 1942 Japan’s Imperial General Headquarters, with approval from the Emperor, agreed to the evacuation of all forces from the island and the establishment of a new line of defense for the Solomons on New Georgia.
Conceding the hard-fought campaign to the Allies, Operation Ke – in all aspects a Japanese Dunkirk conducted over three nights between February 2 and February 7, 1943 – succeeded in the evacuation of 10,652 troops. Over 20,000 Japanese had died on Guadalcanal.
Even in the end it was a close run fight. The most striking thing is the virtual equality of the results — 24 ships on each side, with comparable tonnage. However, the meaning of this was very different for each side. One is that the Allied losses, all American except for the Australian cruiser Canberra, were going to be replaced. The new ships were building at the time. Japanese losses mostly could not be made good. They were constrained to fighting the War with what they had and could not build replacements.
Total Naval Losses at Guadalcanal |
||||
ship |
Allied |
tonnage |
Japanese |
tonnage |
Aircraft Carriers |
2 |
44,600 |
1 |
12,700 |
Battleships |
0 |
0 |
2 |
73,200 |
Heavy Cruisers |
6 |
76,600 |
3 |
31,500 |
Light Cruisers |
2 |
16,800 |
1 |
5,700 |
Destroyers |
14 |
22,815 |
11 |
20,930 |
Submarines |
0 |
0 |
6 |
11,300 |
Totals |
24 |
160,815 |
24 |
155,330 |
With the U.S. victory, Guadalcanal signaled the end of any significant offensive endeavors by the Japanese. Noted by Richard Frank in GUADALCANAL; The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle (800 pages):
The discussion of the operational elements of the campaign draws us back to its overall strategic impact. Quite simply, Guadalcanal was the literal turning point of the war in the Pacific. The Japanese remained on the offensive in the Southeast Area in the summer of 1942 and persisted in an offensive in New Guinea until checked there and forced to focus their attention on the southern Solomons. Moreover, up until the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal the Japanese threatened to crush the attempt of the Allies to move to the offensive. Thus, Guadalcanal, not Midway represented the actual shift in strategic postures.
The victory at Midway didn’t mean we had all the answers for carrier aviation or its support roles, particularly when tied to a “box” defined by staying close to an invasion/occupation site. This geography linkage – CV ops in light of the need to support the land campaign – created significantly different requirements than open ocean warfare. CV vs Cv was one thing, support of amphibious ops and then long term support was quite another. There was a real dichotomy of needs for 1) maintaining maneuverability meaning sea space/open waters for carrier battles and 2) staying within range of the land forces while operating within range of land-based air, submarine forces and potential enemy carriers.
Over the course of 1942 Lexington, Yorktown, Wasp, and Hornet were all lost, but the line was held. The Marine and Army grunts, the sailors, the Cactus Air Force, the Carrier Air Groups, and of note, the blackshoe admirals had made the Japanese pay dearly. Instead of reeling on the defensive post Pear Harbor, the Allies were able to move forward in a positive offensive context. 1943 would bring on the Essex CV and Independence CVL classes and the fast carrier task group would emerge to lead the fight across the central Pacific until Japan was in range of the B-29s.
By way of closing the loop selected elements of the ’42 operations are discussed in Reflections Part #2, and below the overleaf further insight from key authors and historians, are provided for readers interested in more aspects and perspective of the campaign and Pacific warfare throughout 1942.
2] Selected Summaries by noted authors and historians James Hornfischer, Admiral Samuel Cox, Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully: Continue reading
