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Blown Slick Series #13 Part 13-2

To say the least we were in a bad predicament. All of our attack planes were committed on missions with the main enemy force still unlocated and his planes coming in to attack us. The best we could do was to get ready for an air attack and hope for the best.   Captain Davis,  Enterprise 

Blindman’s Bluff (2) – Incoming

Afternoon of the 24th continued

At 16:02, still waiting for a definitive report on the location of the Japanese fleet carriers, the U.S. carriers’ radar detected the first incoming wave of Japanese strike aircraft. Fifty – three F4F-4 Wildcat fighters from the two U.S. carriers were directed by radar control towards the attackers. However, communication problems, limitations of the aircraft identification capabilities of the radar, primitive control procedures, and effective screening of the Japanese dive bombers by their escorting Zeros, prevented all but a few of the U.S. fighters from engaging the Vals before they began their attacks on the U.S. carriers. Continue reading →

Blown Slick Series #13 Part 13-1

Thus begins the day of 23 August, 1942 – Battle of the Eastern Solomons [24–25 August 1942]

At breakfast Fletcher read a special Cincpac Ultra message advising that the “Orange striking force” of two Shokaku-class carriers, two fast battleships, and four heavy cruisers was now “indicated” to be “in or near Truk area,” and thus not nearer to Cactus than one thousand miles. “In Truk-Rabaul area” was “Cinc Second Fleet” with “possibly” two fast battleships and “definitely” four heavy cruisers. This valuable intelligence, however, failed to answer the prime question of when the assault on Guadalcanal might come. With the Japanese carriers so distant, such a move now seemed unlikely for several days.

John B. Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway & Guadalcanal . Naval Institute Press.

The Enterprise under attack around 4;30 in the afternoon of the 24th by the Japanese aircraft from carriers 1000 miles away AM of the 23rd?

Blindman’s Bluff

The battle of the Eastern Solomons (24-25 August 1942) was the second battle in the series of six naval actions linked to the fighting on Guadalcanal and the third of four carrier vs. carrier battles in 1942. Continue reading →

Blown Slick Series #13 Part 12-4

 “…the only place on Earth where you could stand up to your knees in mud and still get dust in your eyes.” Marion Carl

First Marine Ace by Roy Grinnell. Capt. Marion Carl over Henderson Field  – the first Marine Ace of WWII, finishing with 18.5 kills. Awarded the Navy Cross.

Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (COMINCH) and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Ernest King pushed hard in Washington for operations in the Pacific – Navy ops.  The victory at Midway gave him the leverage he needed in the Europe first Washington D.C. comings and goings. King directed Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, Chester Nimitz to move out and thus began the push to move to the offensive by invading  Guadalcanal. The number of ships would grow close to ninety, vastly more than say the Wake Island or Doolittle events. As noted previously it combined land, sea and air combat capability as never before. Watchtower was indeed a recognized gamble, and yet, the planning was seriously short of consideration of that complexity and what situations might evolve, not the least of this would be the lack of early land based air.

There is no Japanese defeat in the Solomons without the defense of Henderson Field and the combat flying of the Cactus Air Force.

Henderson Field and the Beginnings of the Cactus Air Force 

The Situation

The 7 August landings on Tulagi and Guadalcanal at Lunga Point, included the capturing of a partially completed Japanese airfield. Indeed, the uncompleted Japanese airfield was the reason the Americans landed on Guadalcanal in the first place. Continue reading →

Blown Slick Series #13 Part 12-3

“It is true, Marines will take a pounding until their own air gets established (about ten days or so), but they can dig in, hole up, and wait. Extra losses are a localized operation. This is balanced against a potential National tragedy. Loss of our fleet or one or more of these carriers is a real, worldwide tragedy.”  Colonel Melvin J. Maas, USMC TF-61 Staff

TF-61 at Guadalcanal: three of the for carriers in the Pacific in August 1942 – Wasp, Saratoga, and Enterprise.

In a series on carrier operations at the beginning of WWII it would be remiss not to discuss the controversial decisions made by VADM Fletcher concerning withdrawing his TF-61 carriers from the immediate vicinity of the attack after the initial landings. The basic role of the carriers in the Watchtower landings was, of course, to provide air support, in particular fighter cover.

This piece is not intended to cover the events in detail but only to provide basic context in the early evolution of carriers in warfare.  In hindsight it is useful to reflect on two items: 1) TF-61 was composed of three of only four US carriers in the Pacific and 2) it is well worth highlighting how much the rough parity of carrier forces of the two sides contributed to the protracted nature of the overall bloody struggle for the island.

Withdrawal of the Carriers

Continue reading →

 Blown Slick Series #13 Part 12-2

It was one thing to defend Midway operating in open ocean; being closely tied to the geography of the island and surrounding waters to provide air support was a whole other thing. With intelligence far inferior to that during Midway, staying in one general area exposed the carriers to submarine, land and sea based attack. There was much to be learned – at the expense of all participants.

First Day’s Air Support -Problems 

Lieutenant Commander Wallace M. Beakley, Commander Wasp Air Group (CWAG), debrief of operations over Tulagi on the bridge wing of the USS Wasp (CV-7), during operations off Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942 after eight hours airborne. Present are (from left to right) Wasp Commanding Officer Captain Forrest P. Sherman, (wearing helmet), Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, Commander Task Group 61.1 (facing camera), and CWAG Beakley.

The initial operations of 7 and 8 August though mostly successful posed multiple problems. This was most certainly an emerging warfare environment and thus operational learning was critical both in regard to holding Guadalcanal but also in regard to preparation for support of the planned operations of 1943-45 on the pathway to Japan itself. Indeed carrier aviation in 1945 would barely resemble that of ’42.

To understand the evolution of carrier warfare  to include expeditionary warfare here  are abbreviated summaries of the problems noted at the initiation of the Operation Watchtower campaign. Continue reading →