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As a wingman on an “Alpha strike” to targets in North Vietnam during Linebacker I in 1972 – with 30 -40 A-7s, A-6’s, F-4’s, bombers, fighters, Iron-Hand, MiG Cap, tankers, Electronic Warfare birds and an E-2 control, inbound was both a time of anticipation and building tension, and additionally, a period of just waiting and thinking. Over several dozens of these Alphas in an 11 month cruise, I don’t think I ever did not think about what it must have been like on the 4th of June 1942 for my former ops boss at Point Mugu, LCDR Pat Patterson as a 19 year old petty officer radioman/gunner in the backseat of a Bombing 6 (VB-6) Dauntless – and indeed, all those guys from Enterprise, Hornet and Yorktown doing the same thing – looking out over the partially cloud covered Pacific Ocean on their way to the most significant naval battle of World War II.
I first wrote about those reflections 10 years ago -“And so today -4 June 2015 – for me “officially” becomes thefirst remembered sky day.” I try to write something each year with different context. Last year in Battle of Midway – the Legacy,I discussed the issue of a decisive battle in terms of 1) the overall Pacific war outcome itself, and 2) the impact of carrier warfare for the future by ushering in a major change in warfare.
Indeed as noted by John B. Lundstrom in Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway & Guadalcanal… a fundamental transformation in naval power had just taken place. Carriers usurped the prime strategic role of battleships in that their principal opponents were their enemy counterparts, and they should only to be committed to battle in the proper circumstances.
But along with that change with all the conundrums and paradoxes , there is also the lasting paradox brought about by Midway:
the emergence and continuation of the aircraft carrier as a flexible dominant maritime threat and resource as compared to
its potential vulnerability and significance of loss.
Next I have repeated from the original Rememberedsky Day post the final words from Destined for Glory: Dive Bombing, Midway, and the Evolution of Carrier Airpower, by Thomas Wildenberg. A well researched and excellent reference for naval aviation from 1925 through the Battle of Midway June 1942, there are intriguing comparisons for reflection on future airpower.
Finally below that are the links to past postings and multiple highly regarded and recommended references on this day in history .
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Chapter 20:
Reassessing Naval Aviation’s Contribution to Victory
Wildenberg, Thomas (2013-04-08).Destined for Glory: Dive Bombing, Midway, and the Evolution of Carrier Airpower. Naval Institute Press.
PRIOR WORKS DISCUSSING the events surrounding the Battle of Midway have largely ignored the importance of the aerial doctrine developed by the navy during the interwar period. With few exceptions, most authors (and perhaps many historians as well) have led the public to believe that the U.S. Navy— outnumbered four carriers to three— was lucky to have won such a decisive victory, given the poor quality of its aircraft relative to that of the enemy.
Though the gods of war certainly smiled upon the navy’s airmen that day, I feel strongly that the demise of the Japanese strike force was a direct result of the navy’s efforts to perfect dive bombing as the central component of its aerial doctrine. The simultaneous arrival of three squadrons of heavily armed dive bombers over Nagumo’s ships when they were most vulnerable was certainly fortuitous, but not unpredictable, given the nature of seaborne flight operations and the U.S. Navy’s insistence that its own carriers launch their strike groups as soon as possible.
Too much emphasis has been placed on naval aviation’s shortcomings in the early months of World War II, particularly with regard to the deficiencies of its torpedo bombers, and not enough on its successes. It is certainly true that the slow, vulnerable TBD-1 Devastator was obsolete, but its successor— the TBF-1— had already entered the pipeline. A few of the new planes even participated in the Battle of Midway, albeit the TBF-1s deployed from Midway’s airstrip fared no better than their elder brethren! 1 The real problem with U.S. torpedo doctrine lay in the inherent vulnerability of these planes in the face of large numbers of enemy fighters— a situation which had not been encountered before, and one which could not be avoided given the limited number of VFs available and the need to throw everything we had at the enemy. The extremely poor performance of the their torpedoes— a fault that can be attributed directly to the Bureau of Ordnance— only ensured that no hits would be achieved by the few VTs that did get through.
Likewise, many have touted the performance of the Mitsubishi A6M5 Zero while ignoring the Grumman F4F-4 Wildcat. Although the latter was somewhat slower and less maneuverable than the Zero, the F4F-4 had better armament and could take much more punishment because of the self-sealing tanks and armor— features that enabled Jimmy Thach and his men to give as good as they received.
Not enough credence is given to the Dauntless SBD dive bomber, an exceptional aircraft that was a generation ahead of its famous rival, the Aichi D3A Val. Its ability to remain perfectly stable in a dive contributed to the remarkable accuracy obtained by its pilots on that fateful day. These SBDs were armed with a 1,000-lb. bomb fused to go off a fraction of a second after impact so that it would explode just under the flight deck, causing the maximum amount of damage possible with regard to disabling further flight operations.
No one factor determined the outcome of the battle. The navy’s successful effort to break the “Purple Code” of the Imperial Japanese Navy was certainly crucial, as was Nimitz’s decision to take a “calculated risk.” One must not discount the herculean efforts by the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor to repair Yorktown, either, but only dive bombers and the aerial doctrine under which they were deployed were ultimately responsible for sinking the enemy ships of the Imperial Navy’s First Carrier Strike Force.
Vegetation fires, or wildland fires, are the closest thing to military aerial combat a civilian pilot will ever get.
Thanks to Ray “Drifty,” DiLorenzo, a former California fire pilot now living in Montana. And to Skip Leonard for the post in his daily “List.” This is a unique and most important story telling about a different kind of flying than those of us he and I mostly write about – fast mover aviation by Navy, Marine and Air Force fighter/attack/strike fighter pilots. This type of ” Attack” down in the weeds and canyons with high gust winds in a big mutha like a DC-10 is a tale worth knowing about. Hat tip, for sure! Continue reading →
Over the last 32 years I have asked my students of all ages what happened on this day in History and I have found that as the years went by fewer and fewer of them knew what this date meant or even what Pearl Harbor was all about. Very discouraging. History is something that you need to remember so you will not make the same mistakes again. I fear we are still doing that today. Skip Leonard.. The List
This day in Naval and Marine Corps History
1941 – In one of the defining moments in U.S. history, the Japanese attack the U.S. Pacific Fleet and nearby military airfields and installations at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and remove the U.S. Navy’s battleship force as a possible threat to the Japanese Empires southward expansion. The U.S. is brought into the World War II as a full combatant.
As the Japanese attacked Midway Island, 1st Lt. George H. Cannon remains at his post until all of his wounded men are evacuated, though severely wounded himself. Because of his dedication to his men, Cannon dies due loss of blood from his wounds. For his “distinguished conduct in the line of his profession”, Cannon is posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.
On October 15, 2021 Commander Thomas ‘Boot’ Hill, Navy F-4 and F-14 fighter pilot, passed away from esophageal cancer. A-6 pilot Capt. Dave ‘Snako’ Kelly died from melanoma of the brain on 16 March 2014. Randy Anderson, Navy F-8, F-4, and Air Guard F-105 pilot died from Glioblastoma – brain cancer – 0n 4 Dec 2007.
Randy was my best friend out of college and roommate for the first half of flight school, until he got married and we went off to two different air stations for advanced flight training. ‘Snako’ and I were in the same airwing in Airwing Five on USS Midway for Linebacker I & II, he in Intruders and me in Corsairs – participants in many of the same Alpha Strikes into North Vietnam. Snako’s writing from his book Not on My Watch is an integral part of rememberedsky. I didn’t know CDR Hill, but after he was diagnosed with cancer, and began studying the connections of aviation and cancer focusing initially on Naval aviators, he eventually became involved with the Red River Valley Fighter Pilots Association (RRVA) and its Aviator Medical Issues Committee (AMIC). There he worked closely with a longtime friend and supporter of this website, retired F-15 pilot, Air Force Col Vince ‘Aztec’ Alcazar. Aztec is now the lead for AMIC. Continue reading →
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… a fundamental transformation in naval power had just taken place. Carriers usurped the prime strategic role of battleships in that their principal opponents were their enemy counterparts, and they should only to be committed to battle in the proper circumstances .. Lundstrom, John B. Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway & Guadalcanal
Attack on the Akagi by R.G. Smith
On the anniversary of the Battle of Midway (June 4-5 1942) , Rememberedsky offers some reflection on the battle particularly in context of sea-based airpower given current tension and potential conflict in the South China Sea.
I first read Walter Lord’s well acknowledged book Incredible Victory (1967) while an NROTC midshipmen, and have remained intrigued ever since, even after learning that his major source – the book on the battle by the Japanese air wing commander from Pearl Harbor and present at Midway – Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan, the Japanese Navy’s Story – was deeply flawed. (See Parshall and Tully Shattered Sword for the story as reflected from the IJN perspective.) It is unquestionably one of the most extraordinary battles in all of history. Even today, eighty -two years after the battle, Midway is much written about and paradoxes and conundrums remain.
The Battle of Midway has been labeled “an incredible victory,” even a miracle. It is considered by many historians as the turning point in the Pacific war, and in summation, the decisive battle in the WW II Pacific. The battle certainly changed the course of the Pacific War in that the loss of the four Japanese carriers turned the tide in the sense that the U.S. could now consider shifting from a defensive and raiding posture to true offensive action. Yet as Japan discovered at Midway, and the U.S. would learn at Guadalcanal the carrier navy still had much to learn in providing air support for an amphibious offensive and how to provide support in defending the landed force while surviving sea-based threats. That role – beyond fighting ships at sea – boded great peril, and greatly complicated how the carriers could and should be used in combat.
And it must be noted post Midway the Japanese Navy (IJN) continued to plan future offensive operations as if they had never lost four carriers, aircrew and significantly, the experienced flight deck operations crewmen. It was only after the Guadalcanal campaign that their operations took on an almost entirely defensive nature.
(The conclusion for me – certainly not the more common thought – the victory at Midway was undeniably crucial in setting the stage, but the true turning point was the hard fought with almost even losses of the Guadalcanal campaign)
But here we are concerned with Midway’s legacy in the context of the battle as a decisive victory?
This post is a modification extracted from my series “1942 – The Year of the Aircraft Carrier,” particularly the 4 part segment on the Battle of Midway. The overall question of decisive battle in light of the war itself is discussed in the Epilogue.
For sake of argument given the overall focus of the series and on possible lessons from this early application of carrier warfare for future air warfare, let’s consider another context – whether beyond the commonly held points of a major turning point or divisive battle of the Pacific War – that the battle was the decisive battle in ushering in a major change in warfare. This post discusses that issue in light of current world issues in which aircraft carriers would play a most significant part.
To begin consider the definition of decisive battles from 100 Decisive Battles From Ancient Times to Present; The World’s Major Battles and How They Shaped History by historian Dr. Paul K. Davis:
The outcome of the battle brought about a major political or social change – the Norman victory at the Battle of Hastings completely altered the future of the British Isles
Had the outcome of the battle been reversed. major political or social changes would have ensued – had Washington not crossed the Delaware River or lost at Trenton, the defeat almost certainly would have spelled the end of the American Revolution
The battle marks the introduction of a major change in warfare (emphasis added)
On this last – major change in warfare – “decisive” then becomes a term worthy of some consideration in regard to combat aviation and the use and validity of carrier aviation, particularly as to what it’s application at the Battle of Midway signifies for today’s application of airpower.
As noted by Thomas Hone, editor of The Battle of Midway; The Naval Institute Guide to the U.S. Navy’s Greatest Victory, … the real nature of the Battle of Midway was poorly understood for some months after the Japanese defeat, indeed initial credit was given to land-based airpower, but this of course was wrong.
The really effective attacks were made by the Dauntless carrier dive bombers. (Art by Wade Meyers from Capt Kevin Miller’s novel The Silver Waterfall)
The validity of carrier-based airpower came two years later on 19- 20 June 1944, in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. You might think of this as “The Battle of Midway, Round Two.” Fought near the island of Saipan in the Marianas group, the Battle of the Philippine Sea set the somewhat rebuilt Japanese carrier force, commanded by Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, against Admiral Spruance’s Fifth Fleet. Both navies had studied the Battle of Midway, and both had learned from it, but it was only the U.S. Navy that had created a carrier force that could advance deep into enemy territory and defeat both land-based and carrier-based air forces. In two days of multiple air battles, the Japanese lost over 90 percent of the aircraft that they had thrown against Spruance’s carriers and surface ships. Philippine Sea was the “last gasp” of the Japanese fleet’s carrier aviators. It is certainly noteworthy that in an effort to compensate for the defeat of its carrier forces and after its defeat at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, at the end of October 1944 the Japanese navy began using kamikaze (suicide) attacks .
Out of World War II in the Pacific, the carrier emerged as THE U.S. capital ship for domination of maritime military operations for 76 years and running. By way of example:
On 27 June 1950, in response to North Korea’s invasion of South Korea, President Truman ordered naval and air forces to both defend South Korea and deter Communist/Nationalist conflict in Formosa. Valley Forge was the only carrier in the Seventh Fleet and along with the British carrier Triumph formed as Allied Task Force 77 and provided the majority of allied airstrikes on the Korean Peninsula for nearly a month, as the U.S. Air Force worked to establish bases in Korea for tactical aircraft.
With the escalation of the Vietnam War, developments in aerial tactics allowed smaller, lighter aircraft to deliver large payloads against specific targets. By the end of the war, the U.S. Navy had the ability to fulfill any combat mission that the USAF could, from pinpoint precision strikes to nuclear attack, with the Air Force of course retaining its superiority in B-52 bomber style carpet-bombing.
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, five carriers were employed in the March 2003 campaign, while two other carriers were in work-ups and two other carriers were on their way to the theater or held in reserve in the Western Pacific.
In 2014 the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) demonstrated its versatility when the Bush strike group relocated from the Arabian Sea where it had been supporting operations in Afghanistan to 750 NM away in the Arabian Gulf in less than 30 hours and immediately began conducting strikes against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Due to difficulties obtaining basing access and coalition support, the Bush CSG was the only coalition strike force to project air power against ISIS for 54 days.
Since the Battle of Midway, any opponent of the U.S. has had to think and consider how to counter U.S. carrier air power. The Midway battle rightly then can be judged maybe not as the decisive battle of the Pacific war but certainly as deserving of the mantle “decisive” in ushering in such a major long term change in war-at sea.
And yet, despite its mobility, effectiveness and flexibility for crises as a combatant and deterrent, a series of arguments against the Navy’s air arm as a whole and carrier aviation in particular, have persisted throughout the aircraft carrier’s existence. Current anti-access/area denial capability such as China’s DF-21 anti-ship missile highlight current arguments. That A2/AD issue is the basis for most critique on building strategy around CV’s considering the significant cost, high end technology, and people on the newest Ford class CV as seen below, and indeed, what would happen if we lost such a carrier and its 4000 sailors?
USS Ford CVN 78
And thus with all the conundrums and paradoxes from 4 June, 1942 (discussed in the series), there is the lasting paradox brought about by Midway:
the emergence and continuation of the aircraft carrier as a flexible dominant maritime threat and resource as compared to
its potential vulnerability and significance of loss.
But despite its vulnerability, one just does not throw away such capability out of fear of loss. What would have been the consequences had admirals King, Nimitz, Fletcher, Spruance, or Halsey given way to that fear?
No matter how you judge the issue of the Pacific War’s turning point, or decisive battle, naval aviation and indeed a total perspective on U.S. airpower, a huge part of that capability follows as legacy from the Battle of Midway.
I’m 104 and the last survivor of the Battle of Britain – I want to live to 106 to see my crashed plane fly again.
Group Captain John “Paddy” Hemingway is the only surviving pilot of the 2,937 who helped to win the Battle of Britain.
Group Captain Paddy Hemingway.103, is united with a World War11 Hurricane at Casement Air base Baldonnel Near Dublin Ireland Paddy baled out of his Hawker Hurricane over the Thames Estuary After after a dog-fight with German Me 109 fighters. He landed safely near Pitsea his aircraft diving into Fobbing Creek Essex.
War and remembrance No matter the old, “smart” decision makers No matter the politics Or “statecraft” of the DC pundits It was our war We fought it Some lost years Some lost lives Some lost family As young’uns we never set out to buy but still … We own it Band of brothers and sisters WE SHALL EVER BE
National Vietnam Veterans Memorial Day is today, March 29th, and it is also the 50th Anniversary of this special memorial observance. This is the purpose:
“As we observe the 50th anniversary of the Vietnam War, we reflect with solemn reverence upon the valor of a generation that served with honor. We pay tribute to the more than 3 million servicemen and women who left their families to serve bravely, a world away from everything they knew and everyone they loved. From Ia Drang to Khe Sanh, from Hue to Saigon and countless villages in between, they pushed through jungles and rice paddies, heat and monsoon, fighting heroically to protect the ideals we hold dear as Americans. Through more than a decade of combat, over air, land, and sea, these proud Americans upheld the highest traditions of our Armed Forces.Continue reading →
The A-7A/B should be recognized as the end of the linefor pure, iron bomb dive bombers including most famously the Dauntless and the A-1 Skyraider, and the A-7D/E as the beginning of a new era of attack a/c – same airframe and aerodynamics but with a major improvement in the systems/avionics. It is not unreasonable to state that the F/A-18 and F-35 have at their core a technical and operational capability that is Corsair II D/E in design concept technically and philosophically – what we now characterize as “strike fighter.” (F-16, F/A-18, F-35)
The story of the A-7 evolution is a central piece of RG Head’s book, reviewed in the previous post. The following is an excerpt by RG from that story.
The Navy developed the A-7 Corsair II in 1963 to replace the venerable A-4 (A4D). In 1965 the Air Force joined the program, and together they developed the A-7D and E with a revolutionary avionics/weapons delivery system. This is the story of that innovation. Continue reading →
The “attack” mission combines the capabilities and objectives of air interdiction, close air support, strike, and what has come to be known as strategic attack.
“This is a story about flying. It is told by naval aviators, Air Force fighter pilots, and the men who built the airplanes they flew. All served our country with honor. This narrative on attack aviation is a part of our history, an important link from those who were the pioneers of early aviation. They invented ways to use the airplane, built it, maintained it, extended its range, and made it lethal against America’s adversaries. … This story is told using a wide sweep of history over a century, but with concentrations on several case studies that characterize the evolution, technology, and tactics of the time. … The heroes in these stories are the aircraft and the young men (and now women), warts and all, who debated, built, flew, and fought with these aircraft.
These are their stories and their history. We owe them our freedom.” RG Head
Posted inAnalysis, Blown Slick Series, Book Reviews|Comments Off on Book Review: US Attack Aviation: Air Force and Navy Light Attack 1916 to the Present
A-7 Corsair II Association
The A-7 Corsair II Association’s mission is to document the history of the A-7 airplane and those who flew and maintained it, to be a repository and guardian of the extensive Corsair II legacy, and to facilitate contact among former members of the A-7 com
Linebacker II 12/72
On December 18, 1972 the strategic bombing campaign of North Vietnam began. During the 12 days that followed, over 1300 air strike sorties, including 729 by B-52s, pounded North Vietnam day and night. While Navy sorties were less, Carrier-based A-6s flew
